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The Law of Arbitration
Theodore ]. St. Antoine

The law did not look kindly on arbitration in its infancy. As a process by
which two or more parties could agree to have an impartial outsider resolve
a dispute between them, arbitration was seen as a usurpation of the judiciary' sown functions, as an attempt to "oust the courts of jurisdiction."1 That
was the English view, and American courts were similarly hostile. They
would not order specific performance of an executory (unperformed) agreement to arbitrate, nor grant more than nominal damages for the usual
breach. Only an arbitral award actually issued was enforceable at common
law. All this began to change in the 1920s, with the enactment of state statutes to govern commercial arbitration, the adoption of the first Uniform
Arbitration Act, and the passage by Congress in 1925 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 Courts thereafter would enforce an agreement to arbitrate future disputes.
Arbitration as a voluntary method of settling labor disputes gained accep-

1
See generally 6A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§1431--41, 381--425 (West Publishing
Co. 1962); Paul L. Sayre, "Development of Commercial Arbitration Law,'' 37 Yale Law Journal
595, 603-5 ( 1928). It may not have been coincidental that English judges were largely dependent
on case fees for a livelihood. Kulukundus Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
983 (2d Cir. 1942).
2
9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1994). Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act excludes "contracts of employment" from its coverage. The exact scope of that exclusion has never been definitively resolved, but it may remove collective bargaining agreements (which technically are not"contracts
of employment") from FAA regulation. Cf. Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n. 9
(1987); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n. 2 (1991).
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tance in several significant industries at the beginning of this century, although
its roots go back even further. 3 Unions and employers used both interest
arbitration (the setting of the terms of a new contract) and rights or grievance
arbitration (the interpretation and application of the terms of an existing contract). While disagreement exists concerning the extent to which labor arbitration was used prior to World War II, there is no doubt the National War
Labor Board contributed substantially to the growth of grievance arbitration.
When unions and employers could not agree on a contract during the war,
the board would impose one, and it almost invariably insisted on arbitration
as the final step in the grievance procedure. By 1944 the Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported that 73 percent of the collective bargaining agreements in
its files contained arbitration provisions. That figure was to grow to more than
95 percent by the early 1980s.4
About seventy thousand grievance and interest arbitrations are decided annually in this country. 5 Over the years only a tiny fraction of all arbitrationsvarying from less than 1.0 to 1.5 percent-have become the subject of any
sort of court proceedings.6 Yet the law, especially in a litigious society like
ours, is vitally important. Even persons who wish to avoid any resort to the
courts must keep the law in mind in trying to determine their rights and
obligations under an agreement to arbitrate, or under an arbitral award once
it is issued.

' Historical overviews include Edwin E. Witte, Historical Survey of Labor Arbitration (University
of Pennsylvania Press 1952); Robben W. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process 1-30 (University
of Illinois Press 1965); Dennis R. Nolan and Roger I. Abrams, "American Labor Arbitration: The
Early Years," 35 University of Florida Law Review 373 (1983); Dennis R. Nolan and Roger I.
Abrams, "American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years," 35 University of Florida Law Review
557 (1983); Charles J. Morris, "Historical Background of Labor Arbitration: Lessons from the
Past," in Labor Arbitration: A Practical Guide for Advocates (Max Zimny, William F. Dolson, and
Christopher A. Barreca, eds., BNA 1990).
• U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 2095, Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements 112 (1981).
5
Mario F. Bognanno and Charles J. Coleman, eds., Labor Arbitration in America: The Profession
and Practice 92-93 (Praeger 1992). Less than 5 percent of these are interest arbitrations, with the
great bulk being rights or grievance arbitrations.
6
Frank Elkouri and Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 23 n. 5 (4th ed., BNA 1985).
There are some signs of an increasing willingness to challenge arbitral decisions, with one court
objecting to the "exasperating frequency" of suits brought "under the delusion that, as a matter
of course, the losing party is entitled to appeal to the courts any adverse ruling by an arbitrator."
Posadas Associates v. Empleados de Casino, 821 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1987). See also William B.
Gould N, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards-Thirty Years of the Steelworkers' Trilogy.
The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco," 64 Notre Dame Law Review 464, 472-75 (1989); David E.
Feller, "Presidential Address: Bye-Bye Trilogy, Hello Arbitration!" in Arbitration 1993: Arbitration

and the Changing World of Work, Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators l, 9-13 (Gladys W. Gruenberg, ed., BNA 1994).
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The Legal Framework
State common or statutory law was the basis for enforcing the relatively
few collective bargaining agreements that reached the courts during the
nineteenth century and the first half of this century. Even when executory
agreements to arbitrate became enforceable, however, the courts remained
suspicious of the arbitral process. Perhaps typical was the attitude expressed
in the famous Cutler-Hammer case. 7 The contract there provided that the
company and the union would "discuss payment of a bonus" covering a
specified six-month period and that they would arbitrate "any dispute" as to
the "meaning ... or application" of the contract. In the court majority's
analysis, they found that the union was ultimately seeking to have an arbitrator set the amount of the bonus. The court denied arbitration, concluding: "If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be arbitrated
is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the contract
cannot be said to provide for arbitration." Since Cutler-Hammer days in the
late 1940s, nearly all labor arbitrations in industries affecting commerce
have become subject to federal statutory regulation, and the results are radically different.
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) 8 governs arbitration in the railroad
and airline industries and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley) 9 governs arbitration in almost all the rest of interstate industry. Under the RLA, the National Mediation Board serves as a mediating
agency in interest disputes, and, if both union and employer concur, it handles the arbitration of the unresolved terms of a new contract. The National
Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) deals with rights disputes and grievances under existing contracts. Either union or employer may demand arbitration of a grievance before the NRAB or one of the various system
adjustment boards operating under it. If one party seeks arbitration, the
other party is bound. NRAB members consist of an equal number of carrier
appointees and union appointees. Impartial referees are designated by the
partisan appointees or by the National Mediation Board to break any deadlocks that may occur.
Grievance arbitration in most other interstate industries is subject to the
Taft-Hartley Act, and that is the primary focus of this chapter. State law, of
course, continues to govern arbitration in small businesses wholly engaged
in intrastate commerce. In addition, Taft~Hartley specifically excludes agri7

Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div, 917, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519,
74 N.E. 2d 464 (1947).
8
45 u.s.c. §§151-88 (1994).
9
29 u.s.c. §§141--67, 171-97 (1994).
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cultural workers, domestic help, and both federal and state governmental
employees. Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 10 authorizes the
arbitration of interest disputes and mandates the arbitration of grievances
between federal agencies and unions representing their employees. Many
states have statutes covering arbitration for state and municipal employees.

Section 301 of Taft-Hartley
Wage and price controls existed during World War II. The end of the war
unleashed the pent-up demands of American labor for better pay and other
contract improvements. A flood of strikes in such critical industries as coal
mining, longshoring, autos, steel, and railroads threatened to engulf the country. Many of the strikes were in breach of contract. Yet suits against unincorporated associations like labor unions were often difficult to pursue in the
state courts, since service of process had to be obtained on each individual
member. In 1947 the Republican 80th Congress reacted by adopting Section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 which permits suits in federal district court for
breaches of contracts between employers and labor organizations, with the
latter suable as legal entities.
Section 301 on its face reads as if it were a simple grant of jurisdiction over
suits on labor contracts. But collective bargaining agreements, like other contracts between private parties, had always been regarded as subject to state
substantive law. That created a problem. Under the U.S. Constitution, the
federal courts may assume jurisdiction only when there is diversity of citizenship among all the parties or when there is a question of federal substantive
law. 12 Unincorporated associations such as labor unions possess the citizenship
of all their members. It would thus be rare for diversity to exist in an action
between an employer and a union. As applied in most cases, therefore, section
301 would seem an unconstitutional effort to authorize the federal courts to
enforce state contract law. That is exactly what one learned constitutional
scholar, Justice Felix Frankfurter, thought was happening, as he explained in
an exhaustive eighty-six-page judicial opinion ten years after the section adoption.13
Justice William 0. Douglas was untroubled by these technical niceties. In
the landmark Lincoln Mills decision, he declared on behalf of the Supreme
10
5 U.S.C. §§7101-35 (1994). See generally Henry B. Frazier III, "Labor Arbitration in the Federal
Service," 45 George Washington Law Review 712 (1977); Craig A. Olson, "Dispute Resolution in
the Public Sector," in Public Sector Bargaining 160 (Benjamin Aaron, Joyce M. Najita, and James
L. Stem, eds., 2d ed., BNA 1988).
11
29 u.s.c. §185 (1994).
12
U.S. Constitution, Art. III, §2.
13
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460-546 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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Court that section 301 should not be read "narrowly as only conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations." 14 Instead, it directed the federal courts to
fashion a body of federal substantive law "from the policy of our national
labor laws" to apply in section 301 actions. 15 This crafty maneuver not only
disposed of the constitutional conundrum but also enabled the federal judiciary to develop what can aptly (if nontraditionally) be described as a body of
federal common law for use in interpreting and applying collective bargaining
agreements. Somewhat ironically, Lincoln Mills itself (like most subsequent
section 301 cases) involved a suit by a union to compel an employer to comply
with an agreement to arbitrate, rather than a suit by an employer to compel
a union to comply with a no-strike clause-the latter being the more likely
use contemplated for section 301 by its proponents.
Some esteemed academic commentators, Frankfurter proteges, feared that
Lincoln Mills had imposed on the federal courts a task to which they were
"enormously unequal." 16 They feared not only the sheer volume of litigation
that might be generated by some 150,000 to 200,000 labor contracts across
the country: even more fundamentally, the critics worried that the judiciary
did not have the background and expertise to deal effectively with this unique,
complex form of private bargain. That was thought especially true in the absence of any sort of legislative guidelines concerning the enforcement of
union-management contracts. As it turned out, the justices proved wilier than
the scholars. In the next set of major decisions on the subject, the Supreme
Court neatly finessed the problem of an overtaxed judiciary, and in so doing
provided the greatest impetus for labor arbitration since the National War
Labor Board in World War II.

The Steelworkers Trilogy
The most famous Supreme Court cases on labor arbitration have become
known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. They were decided in 1960, with majority
opinions by Justice Douglas in all three. The first two, Steelworkers v. American
Manufacturing Co. 17 and Steelworkers v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 18 dealt
with the enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate. The third, Steel1
•
15

Id. at 456.
Id. The Court added that state law could be looked to for guidance, but it would become federal
law insofar as it was adopted. The practical effect was to make the Supreme Court the ultimate
authority on the whole new, theoretically uniform body of law being formulated to govern labor
agreements in private industry affecting commerce.
16
Alexander M. Bickel and Harry H. Wellington, "Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case," 71 Harvard Law Review 1, 22-23 (1957).
17
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
1
• 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 19 dealt with the enforcement of an
arbitral award.
The collective agreement in American Manufacturing contained a standard
arbitration clause covering "any dispute" between the parties "as to the
meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agreement."20 An employee settled a workers' compensation claim against the
company on the basis that he was permanently partially disabled. Subsequently, the company refused to return him to his old job. The union insisted he was entitled. to it under the contract's seniority provision. The
Supreme Court held that arbitration should have been ordered because the
function of the judiciary was said to be "very limited" in such circumstances. 21 The issue was whether the claim "on its face is governed by the
contract. " 22 The Court emphasized that judges "have no business weighing
the merits of the grievance." It commented that "the processing of even
frivolous claims may have therapeutic values."
In Warrior & Gulf the union claimed an employer's contracting out of
maintenance work violated a no-lockout provision. The collective agreement
contained a broad arbitration clause covering "differences" or "any local trouble of any kind," but there was an extra wrinkle. A separate provision excluded
from arbitration "matters which are strictly a function of management." 23 The
1
• 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Steelworkers Trilogy has had a significant influence on the judicial
treatment of arbitration agreements and awards in the public sector, both federal and state. But
courts appear more willing to find disputes nonarbitrable and awards unenforceable in the public
sector, especially when financial interests are at stake. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, "The Judicial
Enforcement of Public Sector Grievance Arbitration," 58 Texas Law Review 329 (1980}; Joseph
R. Grodin and Joyce M. Najita, "Judicial Response to Public Sector Arbitration," in Public Sector
Bargaining 229 (Benjamin Aaron, Joyce M. Najita, and James L Stem, eds., 2d ed., BNA 1988);
Anne C. Hodges, "The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector," 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review
631 (1990). Cf. John Kagel, "Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Service: Still Hardly Final and
Binding?" in Arbitration Issues for the 1980s: Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators 178 (James Stem and Barbara Dennis, eds., BNA 1982); Jean McKee,
"Federal Sector Arbitration," in Arbitration 1991: The Changing Face of Arbitration in Theory and
Practice, Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting, National Academy ofArbitrators 187 (Gladys W.
Gruenberg, ed., BNA 1992).
20
363 U.S. at 565.
21
Id. at 567-68. In both American Manufacturing and Warrior & Gulf, Justice Douglas alluded
to his notion, first mentioned in Lincoln Mills, that the arbitration clause is the quid pro quo of
the no-strike clause, and thus to be favored in the interest of industrial stability. But Justices
Brennan, Frankfurter, and Harlan expressly disavowed any necessary connection between the two
provisions. Id. at 573. Since Justice Black did not participate in these cases, and Justice Whitaker
dissented or concurred specially, there were apparently only four Justices subscribing to the quid
pro quo theory at this time. A no-strike clause would certainly not be essential for the validity of
the arbitration clause under standard contract doctrine. Any nonillusory promise on one side of
a bargained-for exchange is legally sufficient to support all the promises on the other side.
22
Id. at 568.
23
Warrior, 363 U.S. at 576.
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Supreme Court stated: "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute,"
adding tersely: "Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 24 The "management function" exclusion was not sufficient: "In the absence of any express
provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the
most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can
prevail. " 25
Justice Douglas went on to explain the preference for arbitration over litigation by extolling arbitrators' "knowledge of the common law of the shop"
and their capacity to take into account not only the express provisions of the
contract but also the more intangible factors affecting worker morale and plant
productivity. Nonetheless, despite all this stress on the values of arbitration
and the congressional policy favoring it, management representatives uneasy
about being dragged into arbitrating a myriad of matters they had never anticipated could take comfort from one key principle of Warrior. The Court
declared that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit. "26 Ultimately, according to Warrior, it is the courts' task, not the
arbitrators', to determine whether a reluctant party has breached a promise
to arbitrate. 27
Sound legal theory and practical common sense afford much more support for the Supreme Court's approach than might appear at first glance.
Under the terms of most collective bargaining agreements, "any dispute" not just any "reasonably arguable" dispute-concerning the interpretation
or application of the contract is subject to arbitration. In ordering the arbitration even of frivolous claims, the courts are doing no more than requiring the parties to live up to their own voluntary commitments. As a
practical matter, even the arbitration of nonmeritorious grievances may
serve a worthwhile therapeutic purpose. It lets the union and employees, or
employer, blow off steam, have their day in court, and perhaps undergo the
2

•

25

Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 584-85. The Court considered this especially true "where, as here, the exclusion clause

is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad." The lower federal courts appear to be of different
minds about the extent to which bargaining history may constitute evidence of an intent to exclude
certain claims from arbitration. Compare IUE v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 928 (1964), with Communications Workers v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 337 U.S.
455 (9th Cir. 1964).
2
• Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582.
27
Later, in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 ( 1964), the Court distinguished between
substantive arbitrability and procedural arbitrability. See infra text at n. 79. As indicated in Warrior, substantive arbitrability, dealing with the coverage of the claim by the arbitration clause, is
a matter for the court, not the arbitrator, absent a contrary agreement by the parties.
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instructive experience of watching their case collapse under the cool gaze of
a disinterested outsider. In any event, the whole affair should be much less
costly, in terms of time, money, and bruised psyches, than a court action
over the same issue.
In Enterprise Whee~ the third case in the Steelworkers Trilogy, an employer
had fired several workers for walking off their jobs to protest the discharge
of another employee. An arbitrator reduced the dismissals to a ten-day suspension. Even though the collective bargaining agreement had expired in
the meantime, the award included reinstatement and full back pay, subject
to a deduction of ten days' pay and any earnings from other employment.
A court of appeals refused to enforce reinstatement or the back pay award
beyond the date of the contract's termination. The Supreme Court reversed,
stating broadly: "The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration
award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements." 28
Again writing for the Court, Justice Douglas sounded several interrelated
themes in Enterprise Wheel. As the person commissioned by the parties to
interpret and apply their agreement, the arbitrator must be allowed considerable flexibility, especially in formulating remedies for situations that were
never anticipated. Yet even so, the arbitrator cannot "dispense his own
brand of industrial justice."29 An arbitral award is valid only if it "draws its
essence" from the labor contract. Although the arbitrator may seek guidance
from many sources, including the law, it would be exceeding the scope of
the submission to base an award "solely upon the arbitrator's view of the
requirements of enacted legislation."30 But a court should not refuse to enforce an award whenever a "mere ambiguity" exists in the accompanying
opinion concerning a possible misuse of law. Justice Douglas concluded that
it is the "arbitrator's construction which was bargained for," and the courts
"have no business overruling" it just because they interpret the contract differently. 31
Elsewhere I have argued at length that the lesson of Enterprise Wheel is that
we should treat an arbitrator as the parties' formally designated "reader" of
the contract. 32 Naturally, I mean nothing so simple-minded as the notion that
the arbitrator should be able to find ~e answer to all arbitral issues within
28
2
•

Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596.

Id. at 597.
Id. at 597-98.
31
Id. at 599.
32
Theodore J. St. Antoine, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny," in Arbitration 1977: Proceedings of the 30th Annual Meeting,
National Academy of Arbitrators 29-30 (Barbara D. Dennis and Gerald G. Somers, eds., BNA
1978), reprinted as revised, 75 Michigan Law Review 1137, 1140 (1977).

30
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the four corners of the document or in the "plain meaning" of the text. My
point, rather, is that the arbitrator is the parties' joint alter ego or mutual
mouthpiece, and thus, when the arbitrator speaks, the parties speak. That is
the purport of the "final and binding" language of the standard arbitration
clause. The arbitrator is the parties' surrogate for striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated omissions of the initial
agreement. What the award says is the parties' contract.
Important practical consequences flow from this analysis. First and foremost, a "misinterpretation" or "gross mistake" by the arbitrator is a contradiction in terms. As long as there is no fraud or exceeding of authority by the
arbitrator, all he or she is doing is "reading" the parties' agreement as they
meant it to apply to the new situation at hand. As Enterprise stated, the parties
bargained for the arbitrators' construction, and that is what they are getting.
For a court, it is the same as if the parties had entered into a written stipulation
spelling out their own definitive interpretation of the labor contract. The court
may have independent legal grounds for refusing enforcement of the arbitral
award, just as it might have refused to enforce the contract itself, but arbitral
infidelity to the terms of the agreement should not be among them.
A second, subsidiary conclusion follows from viewing the arbitrator as contract reader. In the debate over what an arbitrator should do when confronted
with what seems an irreconcilable conflict between the parties' agreement and
"the law," 33 my analysis supports those favoring the contract. The reasons are
simple. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, expressly or impliedly, the
arbitrator's commission is to interpret and apply their contract, not external
law. Enterprise Wheel is in accord with that position. The parties may have
divergent opinions about both the meaning and the legality of their collective
agreement. They are entitled to the arbitrator's definitive determination of its
meaning before they have to fight out its legality in the courts. Furthermore,
the law is almost never perfectly clear. For example, on the highly significant
issue of the validity of seniority systems perpetuating the effects of racial discrimination antedating the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court once
overturned an unbroken line of three dozen decisions of the courts of appeals.3'' As a practical matter, however, the great debate over contract versus
law is probably a tempest in a teapot. In the vast majority of cases, the arbitrator should be able to assume that the parties intended their agreement to
See, e.g., Robert G. Howlett, "The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts," in The Arbitrator,
the NLRB, and the Courts: Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting, National Academy ofArbitrators

33

67 (Dallas L. Jones ed., BNA 1967); Bernard D. Meltzer, "Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and
Labor Arbitration," id. at l; Richard Mittenthal, "The Role of Law in Arbitration," in Developments

in American and Foreign Arbitration: Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators42 (Charles M. Rehmus, ed., BNA 1968).
,. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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be interpreted consistent with applicable law (insofar as that can be discerned).
Irreconcilable conflicts will rarely arise.
Reaffirmation of the Trilogy
Despite ominous signs that some lower courts have been less than fully
faithful to the teachings of the Steelworkers Trilogy in recent years, 35 the Supreme Court itself provided a resounding reaffirmation in two unanimous
decisions during the past decade. The first was AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers. 36 Speaking through Justice Byron White, the Court set
forth the following four principles refining and explicating the Trilogy doctrine
on judicial enforcement of an executory agreement to arbitrate:
1. Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party need only submit

a dispute it has'agreed to submit.
2. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,
the question whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular
issue is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.
3. Whether "arguable" or not, and even if it appears to the court
to be frivolous, the union's claim that the employer has violated
the collective agreement is to be decided, not by the court, but,
as the parties have agreed, by the arbitrator.
4. When a contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability and arbitration should not be denied
unless it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitr ability.
Significantly, as emphasized by Justice William Brennan in his concurrence,
there was a colorable argument in AT&T Technologies that the question of
arbitrability should have gone to the arbitrator, rather than being decided by
a court, because the issue of arbitrability and the merits of the dispute were
so "entangled" that there was a risk the court would be deciding the merits
35
See infra text at nn. 194-96, 201-3. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, "Arbitration, Contract,
and Public Policy," in Arbitration 1991: The Changing Face of Arbitration in Theory and Practice,
Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting National Academy ofArbitrators 65 (Gladys W. Gruenberg,
ed., BNA 1992); David E. Feller, supra n.6; Stephen R. Reinhardt, Bernard D. Meltzer, and Abraham H. Raskin, "Arbitration and the Courts: Is the Honeymoon Over?" in Arbitration 1987: The
Academy at Forty, Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 25, 39,
55 {Gladys W. Gruenberg, ed., BNA 1987).
36
475 U.S. 643 (1986).
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under the guise of deciding arbitrability. A management functions clause apparently authorized the termination of employment, including certain layoffs,
without review through arbitration. Nonetheless, for Justice Brennan and
seemingly for the majority as well, that logic could lead to the conclusion that
the arbitrability of almost any dispute could turn on the merits, with the
arbitration clause being swallowed by the excepting exclusion.37 This fear
seems rather far-fetched, unless arbitrators are deemed much less timid than
courts in upholding their own jurisdiction. More practically, it would appear
that the Court was intent on maintaining the elegant symmetry of the Trilogy,
and incidentally sustaining the one important employer victory there. The
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement is ultimately a contract,
and for all its presumed expansiveness, the initial task of determining its scope
lies with the courts, not arbitrators.
The second of these more recent Supreme Court decisions, Paperworkers v.
Misco, Inc., 38 reexamined the standards for judicial review of an arbitral award
that has been issued. The specific question posed by the case was when a court
may set aside an arbitration award as contravening public policy, an issue
more thoroughly discussed later in this chapter.39 In Misco the Fifth Circuit
had refused to enforce an arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee whose job
was operating a dangerous paper-cutting machine, and whose car had been
found to contain marijuana while in the company parking lot. The Supreme
Court reversed. Justice White, writing for the Court, declared that "as long as
the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." 40 A claim of "improvident, even silly, factfinding" would not be enough. 41
The Court naturally recognized the general common law doctrine that a
contract will not be enforced if it violates a law or public policy. But it cautioned that "a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of [labor]
contracts is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate 'some explicit public policy' that is 'well defined and dominant, and is
to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests.' " 42 The Court majority,
however, expressly declined to address the union's position that "a court may
refuse to enforce an award on public policy grounds only when the award
37

Id. at 654.
484 U.S. 29 (1987).
39
See infra text at nn. 187-206.
40
484 U.S. at 38.
41
Id. at 39.
42
Id. at 43, quoting from W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)
(emphasis in the original).
38
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itself violates a statute, regulation, or other manifestation of positive law, or
compels conduct by the employer that would violate such a law."43 The latter
observation plainly leaves open some substantial questions, and the lower
federal courts have continued to disagree about the appropriate scope of their
reliance on "public policy'' in considering whether to enforce arbitral awards.
We shall deal with this critical topic later. 44
Strikes over Arbitrable Grievances

An arbitration clause may do more than facilitate an impartial third party's
ruling on a disputed issue. It may also enable an employer to obtain an injunction against a strike during the term of a collective agreement, despite the
anti-injunction ban of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 45 That was probably not the
result intended by Congress in passing section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
When Congress gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce labor
contracts, it deliberately rejected proposals to amend Norris-LaGuardia to take
account of this new development. 46 The Supreme Court initially made the
obvious, logical deduction. Even strikes in breach of contract remained covered by the prohibition of federal injunctions in peaceful labor disputes. 47 But
there were evident policy deficiencies in this position. Most important, employers were deprived of what is ordinarily the most sensible and efficacious
weapon against forbidden strikes.
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,48 the Supreme Court managed to confound the logic of its earlier decision and do justice at last. An
artful, if somewhat contrived, opinion by Justice Brennan reasoned that Congress's refusal to amend Norris-LaGuardia when enacting Taft-Hartley did not
mean the injunction ban was left intact. It merely meant Congress was prepared to let the federal judiciary work out an appropriate "accommodation"
between the two statutes. Justice Brennan's solution was to authorize federal
injunctions against strikes when the underlying grievance is subject to a "mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure" in a collective bargaining agreement. While this approach may offend purists in statutory
construction, there is much to commend it in elementary fairness. Norris" Id. at 45 n. 12.
44
See infra text at nn. 187-206.
•• 29 u.s.c. §§101-15 (1988).
46

The House Conference Report expressly observed that a provision in the House bill lifting the
Norris-LaGuardia ban in contract actions had been deleted. H. Conf Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947). Senator Rob~rt Taft, who chaired the conference, informed the
Senate: "The conferees ... rejected the repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 93 Cong. Rec. 644546 (1947).
47
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
48
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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LaGuardia was designed to protect struggling unions against a biased, injunction-wielding judiciary, especially when a union is attempting to organize
nonunion workers. When an established union has committed itself contractually not to strike and has been provided an effective alternative means of
redress through arbitration, it is hardly a desecration of Norris-LaGuardia
philosophy to grant the employer an injunction if the union goes back on its
word and strikes.
The Supreme Court has applied the Boys Markets test for injunctive relief
with surprising literalness in favor of labor organizations. Thus, in Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Steelworkers,49 the Court held that no injunction was available
against a sympathy strike that was arguably a violation of the union's no-strike
pledge. The key was that the strike was in support of other unions negotiating
with the employer. The strike was not triggered by a dispute between the
employer and the striking union, and hence the union had no grievance it
could resolve through arbitration under its own contract. Remedies other than
an immediate injunction were of course available to the employer, including
resort to arbitration. Furthermore, it appears that if an arbitrator issues a
cease-and-desist order against a sympathy strike, the employer could get a
federal court to specifically enforce that award and thus halt the strike.50 That
would be true even though the strike was not directly subject to a federal
injunction. 51
As can be seen, what determines the availability of an immediate Boys Markets injunction, even before the issuance of any arbitral award, is the scope of
the arbitration clause, not the scope of the no-strike clause. Indeed, even in
the absence of any express no-strike provision, the courts will infer the existence of a no-strike commitment from the presence of a final and binding
arbitration clause. 52 In establishing this principle in the Lucas Flour case, 53 the
Supreme Court commented that a "contrary view would be completely at odds
with the basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral pro-

•• 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
50
See, e.g., New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Longshoremen's Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Longshoremen's Ass'n, 454 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1971).
" The effect is to create one category of arbitral awards, that is, those ordering the halt of a union
strike in breach of a no-strike commitment, which will have greater judicial enforceability than
the parties' own contract. This apparent anomaly may be explained by the underlying NorrisLaGuardia policy against direct judicial intervention into labor disputes, since here the arbitrator
serves as a buffer between the court and the parties.
" Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
53
Id. at 105. See also LMRA §203(d), 29 U.S.C. §173(d)(1988): "Final adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
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cess as a substitute for economic warfare." That does not mean that a nostrike clause is meaningless. If there is no arbitration clause, or if the no-strike
clause is broader than the arbitration clause, the no-strike clause may be the
basis for a damage action against the union for breach of contract, or it may
be the basis for disciplinary action against striking employees.
When the employer as well as the union is entitled to refer disputes to
arbitration, the employer must pursue arbitration rather than suing directly
for damages, even though the union has allegedly struck in violation of contract. In Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local 50,54 the Supreme Court
declared that it could "enforce both the no-strike clause and the agreement
to arbitrate by granting a stay [of the employer's action] until the claim for
damages is presented to an arbitrator." 55 Suits in equity are treated differently
from damage actions. The Court decided without discussion in Boys Markets
that the employer could move directly for an injunction against the strike
without first obtaining an arbitral award, as long as it was prepared to accept
arbitration of the underlying dispute as a condition of the injunction.56

Section 301 Preemption
In Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court established
that when a suit was brought under section 301 to enforce a labor contract, a
federal court would apply federal substantive law. That left open a couple of
important questions. Could state courts still take jurisdiction over actions on
union-management agreements? If so, whose law-federal or state-would
be applicable?
In the 1960s, the doctrine of federal preemption, or the displacement of
state rights and procedures by federal law and federal tribunals, was at full
tide, brooking few exceptions. Thus, in dealing with unfair labor practice issues, the basic principle was that if certain conduct was "arguably subject" to
the protections of section 7 or the prohibitions of section 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act, then state jurisdiction would be superseded.57 Nonethe370 U.S. 254 (1962).
Id. at 264. The union's right to arbitrate may survive even a prolonged strike in violation of its
agreement. Packinghouse Workers Local 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964).
56
398 U.S. at 254. The injunction must also be warranted under the "ordinary principles of
equity," such as the likelihood of irreparable injury. Id.
57
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Street, Electric Railway&
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Exceptions enabled state damage or
injunction actions for violence or other imminent threats to public order, UAW v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958), and for matters of"merely peripheral concern" to the federal regulatory scheme,
such as internal union affairs, Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). The relationship
between contract enforcement under §301 and the jurisdiction of other federal tribunals, like the
NLRB and the EEOC, is discussed infra text at nn. 99-120.
5•
55
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less, in Dowd Box 58 the· Supreme Court concluded that section 301 did not
divest state courts of jurisdiction over a suit for violation of a contract between
an employer and a labor union. To the argument that concurrent state court
jurisdiction would lead to a disharmony of result incompatible with the Lincoln Mills concept of an all-embracing body of federal law, the Court responded: "The legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of §301 (a)
was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums for the enforcement
of contracts made by labor organizations."59
That did not mean a state court could utilize state law as such in deciding
controversies over labor agreements. The Supreme Court made clear in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 60 that the "substantive principles of federal
labor law must be paramount." Otherwise, the possibility of differing interpretations under federal and state law of the same contract terms would constitute a "disruptive influence" on the collective bargaining process and the
industrial peace that federal labor policy aimed to promote.61
Section 301 preemption, if pushed too far, could have some serious adverse
consequences for certain important state law rights of individual employees.
At present the touchstone of preemption is apparently whether there has to
be any significant interpretation of the labor contract in the course of entertaining the state law claim.62 Only if the state claim can be considered wholly
separate and apart from the contract, as in the case of an employee's action
under the antiretaliation provision of a state workers' compensation statute,
is preemption avoided. Otherwise, if evaluation of the state claim is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,"63
including arguably an arbitration clause or a "just-cause" discharge requirement, the state law is preempted.64
I agree with Professor Michael Harper65 that the Supreme Court has taken
an overly simplistic view of contract preemption. Why, for example, should a
union employee be denied the benefit of a state law right merely because a
collective agreement might have waived the right or provided a private en58

Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
Id. at 508-9. The practical effect of Dowd Box may be considerably diminished, however,
because §301 actions are subject to removal to federal court. Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge
735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
60
369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
61
Id. at 103--4.
62
Compare Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); with Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
63
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213.
64
See, e.g., Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991).
65
Michael C. Harper, "Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy, Only One
for Lingle and Lueck," 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review685 (1990). Harper finds support in the recent
Supreme Court decision of Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994).
59
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forcement procedure, and there would have to be a resort to contract interpretation to make that determination? Harper would substitute the following
test: there should be no preemption of a state law action that exists independently of a collective agreement and can proceed without reference to rights
secured or duties imposed by that agreement.
In the past the Supreme Court has exhibited considerable deference, despite
preemption doctrine, to state law dealing with employment discrimination,66
"minimum labor standards,"67 and worker welfare68 generally. Indeed, I
should think there could be constitutional questions presented if unionized
workers wound up worse off than nonunion employees under state protective
legislation because they had exercised their federal rights to organize and bargain collectively. The Supreme Court ought to revisit this issue. Even a generally salutary principle like federal preemption can be carried to mischievous
extremes.

Major Principles of Federal Arbitration Law
Contracts Covered
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act speaks of suits for "violation" of "contracts" between employers and labor organizations, not "collective bargaining
agreements." Accordingly, an action to enforce a "statement of understanding" between a union and an employer may be maintained under section 301,
even if the contractual arrangement does not rise to the level of a true collective
agreement and even if the union is only a minority representative. 69 The circuits are divided over whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under
section 30 I to determine the existence of a collective agreement or to order
arbitration when the ultimate issue is the validity and not just the "violation"
of a union-employer contract. 70 Denial of jurisdiction in such instances would
seem an exercise in pettifoggery. In every instance of an alleged contract "violation," doesn't one first have to determine or assume that a contract exists?
Initially, in a much-cited decision from the First Circuit, it was held that
section 301 would not support a suit to enforce an interest-arbitration agree66

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
·
68
New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
69
Retail Clerks Locals 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
70
Compare McNally Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Iron Workers, 812 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1987), and Board
of Trustees v. Universal Enterprises, Inc., 751 F.2d 1177 (11th Cir. 1985) (sustaining jurisdiction);
with Adams v. Budd Co., 349 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1985), and NDK Corp. v. Food & Commercial
Workers Local 1550, 709 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying jurisdiction).
67
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ment, that is, an agreement to arbitrate the terms of a new contract. 71 The tide
has since swung very definitely the other way, with several courts of appeals
upholding jurisdiction over such actions. 72
Individual contracts of employment are of course not covered by section
301. The more general Federal Arbitration Act, 73 which is primarily designed
for the commercial sphere, contains an express exclusion of "contracts of
employment." In light of the legislative history of the FAA, it is possible to
argue that the intent was to exclude only collective bargaining agreements, or
perhaps only the contracts of employment of workers engaged directly in
interstate transportation. 74 In any event, the Supreme Court held in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 75 that an arbitration clause contained in a brokerage employee's securities registration application was not part of his employment contract, and was thus enforceable under the FAA. That opens the
way for an effort by employers to enter into arbitration agreements with their
employees, separate and apart from the hiring contract, which would be subject to the FAA.

Limitations Period
In Hoosier Cardinal76 the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of an
explicit statute of limitations to govern section 30 I suits, the analogous state
statute would apply. Hoosier Cardinal was a garden-variety contract action by
a union to recover back wages allegedly due a group of employees. Subsequently, without overruling Hoosier Cardinal, the Supreme Court began to
back away from some of the implications of this dubious reliance on variegated
state law. In DelCostello v. Teamsters 77 an individual employee brought a "hybrid" action against both the employer for breach of contract and the union
for breach of the duty of fair representation. To the Court there seemed no
71

Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956), aff'd, 241
F.2d 787 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957).
72
Builders Ass'n of Kansas City v. Kansas City Laborers, 326 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 917 (1964); Pressmen's Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 399 F. Supp. 593 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975); Sheet Metal Workers Local 20 v. Baylor Heating
& Air Conditioning, 877 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1989); Sheet Metal Workers Local 104 v. Simpson
Sheet Metal, 954 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1992).
73
9 u.s.c. §1 (1994).
74
See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, "Arbitration of Employment Disputes without Unions," 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 753, 760-62 (1990). But cf. Matthew W. Finkin, "Commentary on 'Arbitration of Employment Disputes without Unions,' " 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 799, 802-3
(1990).
75 Ill S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
76
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
77
462 U.S. 151 (1983).
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close analogy in state law. Instead it turned to the six-month limitations period
prescribed by section I0(b) of the NLRA. The Court reasoned that the array
of interests Congress was balancing there paralleled those presented in the
employee's hybrid contract/fair representation suit.
DelCostello left unsettled the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in
actions by unions or employers to compel arbitration, or to enforce or vacate
an arbitral award. Lacking guidance from the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeals have headed off in diverse directions. The trend, however, is to apply
the NLRA's six-month period to suits to compel arbitration and the analogous
state statute to enforce or challenge an award. 78 The distinction makes some
sense. In getting to arbitration, there is a premium on quickly easing workplace
tensions by determining how to resolve a dispute. Once an award is issued,
rights are at least presumptively fixed and most state arbitration statutes have
a directly applicable limitations provision.

Procedural Arbitrability
In John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,79 the Supreme Court introduced a distinction between substantive arbitrability and procedural arbitrability. Substantive arbitrability deals with whether the subject matter of the claim is
covered by the arbitration clause. As set forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy, that
is an issue for a court, not the arbitrator, unless the parties themselves agree
otherwise. Procedural arbitrability deals with such questions as whether
the moving party has fulfilled the prerequisites to arbitration, including
timely submission of the grievance and appeal through all the necessary steps.
Since the Court felt that issues of procedural arbitrability are likely to
be linked closely to the merits of a claim, the Court ruled that they fall
within the province of the arbitrator rather than a court, absent a contrary
agreement by the parties. I have never been all that convinced by this "linkage" argument, but simply as a practical matter of conserving judicial
resources, it seems advisable not to clutter up the courts with these procedural issues.
Extending Wiley, the Supreme Court held that whether a union grievance
was barred by "laches" was a question for the arbitrator to decide when there
was a broad arbitration agreement applicable to "any difference" not settled
by the parties within forty-eight hours of the occurrence, even if the claim of
laches was "extrinsic" to the procedures under the labor contract.80
78

Patrick Hardin, ed., The Developing Labor Law 972 (3d ed., BNA 1992).

79

376 U.S. 543 (1964).

80

Operating Engineers Local 150 v. Flair Bldrs., Inc., 406 U.S. 487 (1972).

The Law of Arbitration .

19

Expired Contracts
An arbitration clause may have a significant legal impact even after the
expiration date of a collective agreement. In Nolde Bros. 81 the contract provided for binding arbitration of "any grievance." After the termination date,
the company announced it was permanently closing the plant. It paid the
employees their accrued wages and vacation pay but refused to provide the
severance pay called for in the labor agreement. The union sued to compel
arbitration under section 301 and the Supreme Court held that the issue of
severance pay was arbitrable. Said Chief Justice Warren Burger for the Court:
"The dispute ... , although arising after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, clearly arises under that contract.... By their contract the
parties clearly expressed their preference for an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
interpretation of their obligations."82
The Court qualified Nolde in the Litton Financial case.83 An employer unilaterally modified its operations and laid off some of its most senior employees
ten to eleven months after the expiration of a contract calling for layoffs according to seniority. The NLRB found a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain
violation and directed bargaining but declined to order arbitration. A 5-4
Supreme Court majority agreed that, under Nolde, postexpiration arbitration
is required only with respect to "disputes arising under the contract." That
would involve facts occurring before the contract expired or "accrued or
vested rights." The four dissenting justices believed that the majority had improperly examined the merits of the contractual dispute under the guise of
determining arbitrability.
If an employer's obligation to arbitrate survives the expiration of the contract in certain circumstances, what about the union's obligation not to strike?
A court of appeals has held that a no-strike clause did not bar a union's
postcontract economic strike, even though the employer remained bound to
arbitrate. 84 The NLRB has taken a different view. 85 Another court of appeals
held an economic striker's discharge for picket line misconduct was arbitrable
under a contract that went into effect after the strike ended.86 The arbitrator
would have to decide whether the striker was an employee on the effective
date of the contract and thus subject to its just cause provision.
Nolde Bros. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Local 358, 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
Id. at 249, 253 (emphasis in the original).
83
Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991).
84
Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting Div., 635 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
985 (1981).
85
Goya Foods, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1978).
86
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 4-23 v. American Petrofina Co., 820 F.2d 747 (5th Cir.
1987).
81

82
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Successorship
Under certain conditions a "successor" employer may have an obligation
to bargain with the union that represented the predecessor's employees,87 or
even to honor in whole or in part the predecessor's labor contract. In John
Wiley & Sons 88 a small unionized publisher, Interscience, merged into a much
larger nonunion firm, Wiley, and ceased to exist as a separate entity. The union
claimed that Wiley was obligated to recognize certain "vested" rights of the
Interscience employees under their contract, and sued Wiley under section
301 to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court held that arbitration could be
ordered, assuming "substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise
before and after [the] change."89
Wiley was severely limited by the rationale, if not the holding, in the subsequent Burns Security case. 90 Burns replaced Wackenhut through competitive
bidding to provide plant protection for Lockheed Aircraft, and hired a majority of the Wackenhut guards to handle the job. The Supreme Court, in a
5-4 decision, upheld the NLRB's order that Bums bargain with the union that
had previously represented the Wackenhut employees. But the Court ruled
unanimously that the NLRB had erred in requiring Bums to honor the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the union and Wackenhut.
Speaking for the Court, Justice White distinguished Wiley on the dubious
grounds that it involved a section 301 suit to compel arbitration, not an 8(a)(5)
refusal-to-bargain charge before the NLRB, and on the quite convincing
grounds that there was "no merger or sale of assets, ... no dealings whatsoever
between Wackenhut and Bums."91 Indeed, the latter seems so true that dissenting Justice William Rehnquist appears entirely correct in insisting that
Bums was not a "successor" of Wackenhut at all, but rather, as the majority
itself conceded, a competitor for the same Lockheed business. Without any
formal nexus between the two employers, neither contractual nor bargaining
rights should have carried over.

87

See generally Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). For a continuation of the union's bargaining rights, there must be (1) a substantial continuity of identity
between the two enterprises in the nature of the business operations, the type of work performed
by the employees, and the employers' production processes, products, and customers; (2) a majority of the successor's employees who had been employed by the predecessor; and (3) an appropriate bargaining demand by the union.
88
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
•• Id. at 551. The union in Wiley was not claiming bargaining rights apart from the Interscience
contract. If any employee majority was relevant to the contract claim, it would seem more logical
that it was a majority of Interscience's employees coming to Wiley.
90
406 U.S. 272 (1972).
91
Id. at 286.
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In a later case, Howard.Johnson,92 Howard Johnson purchased the personal
property used in a franchisee's restaurant, leased the realty, and resumed operations with only a small handful of the predecessor's workers. The union
that had represented the former franchisee's employees sued under section
301 to arbitrate the extent of Howard Johnson's obligations under the predecessor's labor contract. The Supreme Court applied Burns, even though it
dealt with an 8(a)(5) charge rather than a section 301 suit, and sustained
Howard Johnson's refusal to arbitrate. The Court declared that Wiley "involved a merger, as a result of which the initial employing entity completely
disappeared.... Even more important, in Wiley the surviving corporation
hired all of the employees of the disappearing corporation."93
Wiley, Burns, and Howard Johnson are all reconcilable on their facts. They
leave open the possibility that the contractual successorship doctrine developed by the Warren Court in Wiley might still apply when there is a genuine
link between predecessor and successor and a majority of the farmer's employees remain with the latter.94 What was more likely reflected in the division
between the first case and the later pair, however, was a fundamental clash of
values in the labor area. To the Warren Court a collective bargaining agreement was "not an ordinary contract" but a "generalized code" setting forth
"the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."95 A predecessor's labor contract could bind a successor employer when there was
"substantial continuity of identity'' without regard to actual consent. In Burns
and Howard Johnson, the Burger Court refocused attention on traditional
common law notions of the need for "consent" under "normal contract principles," and on the question of whether certain rights and duties were "in
fact" "assigned" or "assumed."
The Warren majority was concerned about protecting employees against a
sudden and unforeseen loss of bargaining and contract rights. There was also
a concern about maintaining industrial stability and labor peace through reducing the number of representation elections and sustaining the life of labor
agreements, including their provisions on arbitration. On the other hand, the
Burger majority laid stress on the freedom and voluntary nature of the collective bargaining process, and on the importance of saddling neither unions
nor employers with substantive contract terms to which they have not agreed.
Stress was further laid on providing maximum flexibility in business arrange92

Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Detroit Local Joint Board, 417 U.S. 249
(1974).
93
Id. at 257, 258 (emphasis in the original).
94
It would of course be unlawful discrimination in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA for
a successor employer to refuse to hire its predecessor's unionized employees in order to prevent
such a majority. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 262 n. 8.
95
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
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ments, so that employers might respond to changing market conditions without being straitjacketed by the bargaining or contractual obligations that may
have been assumed by imprudent predecessors. The future development of
successorship law undoubtedly depends far more on the way the members of
the Supreme Court ultimately balance these competing values than on any
logical deductions from the decisions to date.
Seemingly distinct business entities may be bound by the same bargaining
or contractual obligations not only on the basis that one is the "successor" of
the other but also on the basis that one is the "alter ego" of the other or that
they are in reality a "single employer."96 Actual control of personnel rather
than the corporate identity of the owners is the key to alter ego status.97 An
employer that sold all its stock to another company but operated as a going
concern with the same management and the same employees was a "continuing" employer, not a successor at all, and thus remained bound by the preexisting labor contract.98
Overlapping Contract and Statutory Rights
The parties to a collective bargaining agreement may include a prohibition
of coercion or discrimination because of union activity, thus paralleling section 8(a)(l), (a)(3), (b)(l)(A), and (b)(2) of the NLRA, or a prohibition of
discrimination because of race, sex, age, or disability, thus paralleling provisions of various civil rights acts.99 Disputes over the application of these contract terms would ordinarily be subject to arbitration. At the same time, an
employer's unilateral change in the terms of employment without bargaining
is a violation of section 8(a}(5) of the NLRA-and when a collective agreement
is in existence, that agreement is obviously the standard of many, if not all,
the employment terms in a unit. The inevitable result of all this is the possibility of an overlap, or even conflict, between contractual rights and procedures and statutory rights and procedures.
Pre-arbitration deferral. In a relatively early decision in the late 1960s, NLRB
v. C&C Plywood Corp., 100 the Supreme Court held that even though an em-

96
See, e.g., Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942); Howard Johnson, 417
U.S. at 249 n. 5. Compare Telegraph Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 827 (1978); withAlkirev. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983); with NLRBv. CampbellHarris Elec., Inc., 719 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1983).
97
NLRB v. Omnitest Inspection Serv., 937 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1991).
98
EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1988).
99
See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e17 (1994); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§621-34 (1994); the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§12101-13 (1994).
100
385 U.S. 421 (1967). See also NLRA §IO(a), 29 U.S.C. §160(a) (1994): "This power [of the
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ployer had an arguable contractual defense to certain unilateral action it had
taken, the NLRB still had jurisdiction to deal with a union's 8(a)(S) charge of
refusal to bargain. C&C Plywood was atypical in that the collective agreement
did not provide for binding arbitration and it was possible that no contract
provision covered the dispute. Nonetheless, the NLRB and the lower courts
subsequently held that the board could exercise 8(a)(S) jurisdiction even in
cases where there was an applicable arbitration clause and a specific contract
provision governed the matter at issue. 101
Not long after C&C Plywood, the NLRB headed off in a quite different
direction. In Collyer Insulated Wire, 102 a sharply divided (3-2) board held that
when an employer's unilateral action was based on a substantial claim of
contractual privilege, and when an arbitral interpretation would likely resolve
both the contract issue and the unfair labor practice issue, the board would
withhold its processes and "defer" to arbitration. Accordingly, the board dismissed the complaint under section 8(a)(S), but retained jurisdiction to await
developments in the arbitral forum. Later, after considerable vacillation on
the question, another three-member majority extended the Collyer deferral
doctrine to cover individual claims of coercion or discrimination under sections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(l)(A), or 8(b)(2). 103
Collyer has much to commend it in 8(a)(S) cases but it is a good deal more
dubious in discrimination cases. If a contract is the basis of a union's claim
of unlawful unilateral action by an employer, collective rights that have been
privately negotiated are generally at stake. Arbitrators are more likely than the
board to have special expertise in this area. Initial resort to the parties' own
agreed-on machinery for dispute resolution makes eminently good sense. But,
sensitive preexisting statutory rights whose protection is the particular responsibility of the NLRB are involved in 8(a)(3), 8(b)(l)(A), and similar cases.
Furthermore, in any given discrimination case, one should not assume that
the union has waived an employee's statutory access to an administrative remedy just because the union has secured an additional contractual claim. 104
Board to prevent unfair labor practices] shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise...."
101
C & S In<lustries, 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F.2d 964
(8th Cir. 1967).
102
192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
103
United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984) overruling General American Transp.
Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), which in tum had overruled National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B.
527 (1972).
104
See generally Charles B. Craver, "Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective Bargaining Process," 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 571, 612-16 (1990); Harry T. Edwards, "Deferral
to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out ofEverlasting Confusion
at the NLRB," 46 Ohio State Law Journal 23 (1985); Michael C. Harper, "Union Waiver of
Employee Rights under the NLRA: Part II," 4 Industrial Relations Law Journal 680 (1981).
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Nonetheless, despite certain misgivings, the District of Columbia Circuit has
approved the NLRB's current approach to pre-arbitration deferral. 105 A newly
constituted Labor Board may, of course, revisit the whole issue.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 106 the Supreme Court held
that a brokerage employee was obligated to arbitrate his discrimination claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act instead of bringing a
statutory action directly in federal district court. In this instance the arbitration
clause was contained in the employee's securities registration application
rather than in a collective agreement or an individual contract of employment.107 Also emphasized was the employee's agreement to arbitrate "any
dispute, claim, or controversy," presumably including statutory claims, and
not just the contractual claims traditionally subject to arbitration under a
collective agreement. The Court's holding, however, was not concerned with
the degree of deference a court would have to pay the arbitral award when it
was issued. 108
Postarbitration deferraL In the leading Spielberg case, 109 the NLRB set forth
three general conditions under which it would accord "recognition" to an
arbitrator's award affecting an alleged unfair labor practice: "[T]he proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound,
and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." More recently, in Olin Corp., 110 the board
supplemented Spielberg by announcing that it would conclude the arbitral
award was adequate if "(I) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the
unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with
the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice case."
Both Collyer and Spielberg-Olin have obvious attractions for an underfunded NLRB struggling to handle an overflowing caseload. But one can surely
ask whether at times they invite an abdication of the board's statutory duties.
More specifically, unless the parties expressly authorize it, should the NLRB
ever honor an arbitrator's award as a whole, or should it merely adopt any
findings of fact or contractual interpretations that happen also to be essential
parts of the unfair labor practice case? The latter approach would find support
105

Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane).
111 S. Ct. 1647 {1991).
107
The action was grounded in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 (1988). Classifying the
arbitration agreement as separate and apart from the employee's contract of hire enabled the
Court to sidestep the question of the exclusion of "contracts of employment" from the coverage
of the FM.
10
• See infra text at nn. 117-20.
109
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
llO 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
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in the underlying notion that the primary function of the arbitrator is to
interpret and apply contracts, and the primary function of the NLRB (or other
government agency) is to interpret and apply a statute. At any rate, in spite
of some judicial bridling, 111 the Spielberg-Olin doctrine has generally won acceptance in the courts. 112
Occasionally, special "due process" considerations arise in deferral cases.
For example, the NLRB has refused to defer to arbitration, or to honor an
award, when the interests of the aggrieved employees were in apparent conflict
with the interests of the union as well as of the employer. 113 But, the board
has been prepared to abide by the awards of joint union-management committees, as long as the Spielberg-Olin standards are met. 114 In so doing, the
board was following the lead of the Supreme Court, which has held that arbitration by an impartial third party is not essential to judicial enforceability
under section 301. 115 Eminent critics have challenged equating the use of such
joint bodies with arbitration by disinterested outsiders. 116 At least there is
plainly a need for searching scrutiny of the fairness of these joint procedures,
which too often are characterized by unseemly haste and even grievanceswapping.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 117 the Supreme Court declined to extend the Spielberg analysis to civil rights cases. A black employee who was
discharged for allegedly poor work processed a claim through the contractual
grievance process. At the arbitration hearing he testified that the employer's
action was racially motivated in violation of the collective agreement's antidiscrimination provision. The arbitrator nonetheless ruled that the grievant
111
See, e.g., Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Aces Mechanical Corp.,
837 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1988).
112
E.g., NLRB v. Ryder/P.1.E. Nationwide, 810 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1987); Lewis v. NLRB, 779
F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1985); Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 736 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1984); Bakery Workers Local 25 v. NLRB, 730 F.2D 812,
816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
113
Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972); Hendrickson Bros., 272 N.L.R.B. 438 (1984),
enforced, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985); Mason & Dixon Lines, 237 N.L.R.B. 6 (1978).
11
• Ryder Truck Lines, 287 N.L.R.B. 806 (1987); Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546 (1985), aff'd
sub. nom. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987).
115
Teamsters Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963) (award of joint labor-management
committee was final and binding under collective agreement but procedure was not called "arbitration").
116
See, e.g., David E. Feller, "A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement," 61
California Law Review 663, 836-38 (1973); Clyde W. Summers, "Teamster Joint Grievance Committees: Grievance Disposal without Adjudication," in Arbitration 1984: Absenteeism, Recent Law,

Panels, and Published Decisions, Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators 130 (Walter J. Gershenfeld, ed., BNA 1985). Cf. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
351-55 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
117
415 U.S. 36 ( 1974).
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had been terminated for "just cause." The Court held that the adverse arbitral
award did not preclude the employee from later obtaining a trial de novo of
his discrimination claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The
Court stressed that the arbitrator was only empowered to resolve contractual
claims, not statutory claims. Not even the moderate deference standards of
Spielberg were applicable. In an important footnote, however, the Court observed that if an arbitral forum provides sufficient procedural safeguards, a
court "may properly accord ... great weight" to the arbitrator's determination
of Title VII rights, especially as to factual issues. 118
The Court emphasized in Gardner-Denver that a Title VII litigant vindicates
the important congressional policy against employment discrimination, while
a grievant processing a claim through grievance-arbitration procedures merely
vindicates private contract rights. But the same might have been said of the
congressional policy against antiunion discrimination under the NLRA. Surely
an important practical distinction was the peculiar sensitivity of rights against
race or sex discrimination, and the concern that a union in some instances
might not be as zealous in defending Title VII rights as in defending NLRA
rights.
A major change in the Court's attitude may be signaled by the Gilmer case, 119
holding at least that an employee must exhaust contractual arbitration procedures before pursuing an age discrimination claim in court. The precise
issue in Gilmer, of course, did not deal with the weight to be accorded the
eventual arbitral decision. Moreover, Gilmer involved an individual contract
for arbitration, not a collective bargaining agreement as in Gardner-Denver.
Even so, an overworked federal judiciary may be becoming much more receptive to the notion of alternative dispute resolution of claims under civil
rights statutes. Three distinguished federal judges have already publicly extolled the advantages of arbitration over litigation in vindicating statutory
rights against discrimination. 120 Gilmer plainly lends support to that approach,
and may even encourage greater reliance on the arbitration of statutory claims
pursuant to collective agreements.

11

•
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120

Id. at 60 n. 21.
See supra text at n. 106.
Harry T. Edwards, "Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation: Reflections of a Judge," in

Arbitration 1982: Conduct of the Hearing, Proceedings ofthe 35th Annual Meeting, National Academy
of Arbitrators 16, 27-28 (James L. Stem and Barbara D. Dennis, eds., BNA 1983); Betty Binns
Fletcher, "Arbitration of Title VII Claims: Some Judicial Perceptions," in Arbitration Issues for the
1980s, Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 218, 228 (James
L. Stem and Barbara D. Dennis, eds., BNA 1982); Alvin B. Rubin, "Arbitration: Toward a Rebirth,"
in Truth, Lie Detectors, and Other Problems in Labor Arbitration, Proceedings of the 31st Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 30, 36 (James L. Stem and Barbara D. Dennis, eds., BNA
1979).
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Judicial Review
The Legacy of Enterprise
Two important points should be noted about the Supreme Court's approach
to judicial review in Enterprise WheeL 121 First, arbitrators are not limited in
construing a contract to the four comers of the document. They are justified,
for example, in "looking to 'the law' for help in determining the sense of the
agreement." 122 The companion Warrior & Gulf decision is even more expansive: "The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the
industry and the shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement
although not expressed in it." 123 Furthermore, insofar as the contract permits,
the arbitrator is entitled to take into account "such factors as the effect upon
productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop,
his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or dirninished." 124
Allowing the arbitrator to look beyond the wording of the contract is consistent with the thesis that the arbitrator is a contract reader. Contracts are
written with industrial practices and psychology in mind. To decipher a contract whose literal terms do not address the problem at issue, the reader must
examine the implicit as well as explicit agreements embodied in the document.
The second point to be stressed about Enterprise Wheel is that, for all its
extolling of arbitration and its rejection of plenary review, the Court exhibits
an ambivalence about how far it wishes to go in embracing finality. In insisting
that an enforceable award must "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" and must not, for example, be based solely on "the requirements of enacted legislation," the Court plainly appears to authorize some
substantive examination. This is a risky invitation, because a number of courts
will inevitably seize upon any opening to intervene in cases of alleged "gross
error" in construction. 125 As if aware of this danger, the Court, in the latter
portions of its opinion in Enterprise Whee~ returned to the theme of finality
and dismissed the argument that the arbitrator's decision was not based on
the contract because his interpretation was demonstrably wrong under correct
principles of contract law. 126 Warrior & Gulf was still more emphatic that
"judicial inquiry under §30 I must be strictly confined to the question whether
121
122

123
12
12
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Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See supra text at n. 28.
Id. at 596.
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
Id. at 582.
See infra text at nn. 149-55.
Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598-99.
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the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the
arbitrator the power to make the award he made. " 127
Finality versus Rationality

As could be expected, the lower courts in applying Enterprise Wheel have
reflected the Supreme Court's ambivalence toward finality. In Safeway Stores
v. Bakery Workers Local 111,1 28 an arbitrator awarded employees additional
pay for twenty-four hours of unperformed work on the grounds the contract
guaranteed forty hours' pay each week, even though the employer's payment
for sixteen hours in one week resulted from a mere change in pay days and
not from any loss of working time. The Fifth Circuit found that the award
was based on the terms of the contract, observing bluntly: "[J]ust such a
likelihood [of an 'unpalatable' result] is the by-product of a consensually
adopted contract arrangement.... The arbiter was chosen to be the Judge.
That Judge has spoken. There it ends." 129
On the other hand, many courts feel compelled to test an arbitral award
against some minimum standard of rationality. Thus, even the Fifth Circuit
in Safeway Stores conceded an award should be set aside "if no judge, or group
of judges, could ever conceivably have made such a ruling." 130 It has also been
said that the award must in some "rational way be derived from the agreement,
viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the
parties' intention, 131 that the award must not be a "capricious, unreasonable
interpretation," 132 and that it must be "possible for an honest intellect to
interpret the words of the contract and reach the result the arbitrator
reached." 133
Despite the manifest difficulties of drawing lines between what is merely
"arbitrary" or "unreasonable" and what is "actually and indisputably without
foundation in reason or fact," I am reluctantly prepared to accept an additional exception to the finality doctrine worded somewhat along the latter
lines. Besides assuming, in their agreement on final and binding arbitration,
that the arbitrator would be untainted by fraud or corruption, the parties
127

Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
390 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 84. See UAW v. White Motor Corp., 505 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1974); Machinists Dist.
145 v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 495 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974);
JUE v. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 489 F.2d 768 (1st Cir. 1973); Butcher Workmen Local 641
v. Capital Packing Co., 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969); Oil Workers Local 7-o44 v. Mobil Oil Co.,
350 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1965).
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390 F. 2d at 82.
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Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969).
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presumably took it for granted that he would not be insane and that his
decisions would not be totally irrational. Setting aside an irrational arbitral
award is thus consistent with the contract reader thesis. In any event, I do not
think it possible to keep courts from intervening, on one theory or another,
when an arbitral award is so distorted as to reflect utter irrationality, if not
temporary insanity. Indeed, in a number of cases, 134 the courts have indicated
their willingness to intervene in such extreme circumstances. One can hope
that this exception to the finality doctrine does not open the door to undue
judicial interference with arbitral awards. Although unwilling to let go of irrationality or even capriciousness as a possible basis for vacating an award,
the courts are obviously uncomfortable about relying on grounds that trench
so closely on the merits. They much prefer to act, as I shall next discuss, on
the basis of one or the other of the better-recognized exceptions to the deference doctrine.

Qualifi@tions of the Deference Doctrine
Aside from the irrationality exception, courts have recognized two general
limitations on the deference doctrine. The first limitation consists of jurisdictional or procedural defects. Arbitration proceedings are defective if arbitrators
overstep their authority or compromise their neutrality or if one of the parties
fails to carry out its responsibilities. The first five qualifications discussed below come under the rubric of procedural defects, broadly defined. The second
general limitation is that a court will not enforce an arbitral award that conflicts with substantive law or public policy.
Two aspects of these qualifications of the doctrine merit attention. First,
courts generally strive to enforce arbitral awards; they invoke an exception to
the finality doctrine only when the circumstances are compelling. Second, with
the possible exception of the "modification" or "gross error" qualification,
these qualifications comport with the thesis that the arbitrator is a contract
reader. To set aside an arbitral award because of a procedural defect is not
equivalent to finding that the arbitrator misread the contract. Rather, it represents a determination that the premises which make the arbitrator's reading
authoritative or reliable are not satisfied. Significantly, when a court refuses
to enforce an arbitral award because of a procedural defect, the parties remain
responsible for settling their initial dispute; the court ordinarily does not resolve it for them. And when a court declines to enforce an arbitral award that
134
See, e.g., Gunther v. San Diego & A.E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261, 264 (1965) ("wholly baseless
and completely without reason"). See cases cited supra nn. 130-32. Cf. Amoco Oil Co. v. Oil
Workers Local 7-1, 548 F.2d 1288, 1296 (7th Cir.) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
905 (1977).
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violates law or public policy, it does not question the soundness of the arbitrator's reading of the contract; it rules that the contract as read is unenforceable.

Lack of Arbitral Jurisdiction or Authority
In Warrior & Gulf, the Supreme Court demanded an "express provision
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration" or else "the most forceful
evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration" before the presumption in favor of the arbitrability of all disputes concerning the interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement could be overbome. 135
Nonetheless, the arbitrator remains the creature of the contract, and the parties
retain the power to remove such disputes from his or her purview as they see
fit. For example, the electrical industry has historically sought to restrict the
ambit of arbitrable grievances. Thus, where an arbitration clause in an electrical manufacturer's contract explicitly excluded disputes over a merit-pay
provision of the labor contract, an arbitrator was held to have exceeded his
jurisdiction when he sustained a grievance based on that provision. 136 The
parties themselves, of course, may decide whether they wish the question of
substantive arbitrability to go to the arbitrator, instead of to the court. 137 If
their choice is the arbitrator, the same limited standard of review applicable
to decisions on the merits should apply to the ruling on arbitrability. 138
An eminently practical approach for any respondent in arbitration (ordinarily the employer) that believes the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction is to preserve
explicitly the respondent's challenge to jurisdiction and to declare that the
challenge will be presented to a court if there is an adverse decision on the
merits. Courts respect such reservations and do not accord the resulting
awards the usual presumptions of legitimacy. 139
An arbitral award is also subject to judicial vacation for want of authority
if it reaches beyond the boundaries of the "submission," the statement of the
issue as agreed on by the parties. For example, an arbitrator who is empowered
to decide whether an employer has unreasonably increased assembly-line quotas is not authorized to order the parties to negotiate for engineering studies
to guide future quota disputes. 140
135

363 U.S. at 585.
IUE Local 278 v. Jetero Corp., 496 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1974).
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See Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 732 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419
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An arbitrator's authority to make whatever factual findings are necessary
for the decision would seem inherent in the arbitral role. A court should
therefore not set aside an arbitrator's findings of fact if there is any evidence
to support them. In the Misco case, 141 the Supreme Court emphasized that
judges "do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as
an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts." The Court
added: "The parties did not bargain for the facts to ·be found by a court, but
by an arbitrator chosen by them who had more opportunity to observe [the
witnesses] and to be familiar with the plant and its problems."
Arbitrators are subject to the mandate of the parties not only with regard
to subject matter jurisdiction, but also with regard to the capacity to fashion
a particular remedy. Frequently, the arbitrator will find in disciplinary cases
that the employee engaged in the misconduct alleged, but that the discharge
or other sanction imposed is too severe. Most courts will hold the arbitrator
can reduce the penalty in these circumstances, for example, to a suspension
of specified length or to reinstatement without back pay. Often the rationale
is that the arbitrator properly concluded that the heavier penalty was without
"just cause." 142 But if the employer secures a contract clause denying the arbitrator the power to modify discipline, this will ordinarily be enforced by the
courts.143
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of a court's willingness to sustain an
arbitrator's remedial powers, despite contractual limitations on his authority
to "add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provisions of this contract,"
is provided by Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co. 144 Distinguishing Supreme Court precedent restricting NLRB remedies in analogous situations,
the Fifth Circuit held that an arbitrator could award wage increases based on
his projections of the wage settlement that would have been reached if the
employer had not violated its duty to bargain under the wage reopener clause
in a labor contract. But not all courts are so generous. In Polk Brothers v.
Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975); Arvid Anderson, "The Presidential
Address: Labor Arbitration Today," in Arbitration 1988: Emerging Issues for the 1990s, Proceedings
of the 41st Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 1, 6--7 (Gladys W. Gruenberg, ed.,
BNA 1989).
141
Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 45 (1987). See Tanoma Mining Co. v. UMW
Local 1269, 896 F.2d 745, 747--48 (3d Cir. 1990); Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food Co., 712
F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1983).
2
"
E.g., Campo Mach. Co. v. Machinists Local 1926, 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976); Machinists
Dist. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1969); Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Steelworkers Local 2556, 404 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1968).
'" See, e.g., Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. UAW Local 1549, 451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971); Truck
Drivers Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964). But cf. Painters Local 1179
v. Welco Mfg. Co., 542 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1976).
,,. 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
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Chicago Truck Drivers, 145 the Seventh Circuit, in seeming defiance of Enterprise
Wheel, set aside an arbitrator's award of reinstatement and back pay because
it ran beyond the termination date of the collective agreement.
The most troubling current issue concerning an arbitrator's remedial authority-which has even broader implications for an arbitrator's interpretive
authority generally-is illustrated by the successive decisions of the First Circuit in S.D. Warren Co. v. Paperworkers Local 1069. 146 An arbitrator reduced
to suspensions the discharges of three employees for violating a plant rule
against possession of drugs on company property. The arbitrator found that
the discharges were not for "proper cause" under the contract because the
employees had been pressured by an undercover agent into handling the drug.
The court of appeals initially set aside the award on the grounds that it violated
public policy. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Misco. Undaunted, the court of appeals on remand reaffirmed its
holding, this time on the grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority under the contract. The court pointed out that the contract gave the
employer the "sole right" to discharge for "proper cause" and stated that
violations of the rule against drugs were "considered causes for discharge."
The court wholly ignored the notion that the mere listing of drug possession,
among a number of specific offenses that could lead to dismissal, did not
necessarily eliminate the requirement that they would still have to constitute
"proper cause" for discharge under the facts of a given case. Nonetheless, a
couple of circuits 147 are apparently aligned with the First Circuit on its approach, although several others are contrary. 148

Arbitral "Modifications" or "Gross Error"
Collective bargaining agreements often provide that an arbitrator may not
"add to, modify, or otherwise alter the terms of this contract." Such language
paves the way for what is probably the most troublesome of all assaults on
arbitral finality. Torrington v. Metal Products Workers Local 1645 149 is the classic
case. Prior to the negotiation of a new contract, an employer unilaterally an-
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973 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1992).
815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 484 U.S. 983 (1987); on remand, 845
F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1988).
147
Mistletoe Express v. Motor Expressmen, 566 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1977); Firemen and Oilers
Local 935-B v. Nestle Co., 630 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1980). But cf. Eberhard Foods v. Handy, 836
F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1989).
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Kewanee Machinery v. Teamsters Local 21, 593 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1979); F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousemen, 629 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980); Waverly Mineral Prods. Co.
v. Steelworkers, 633 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1980); Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. OCAW Local 8-74, 671 F.2d
752 (3d Cir. 1982).
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nounced the discontinuance of a long-standing practice to pay employees for
one hour away from work on Election Day. An arbitrator sustained the union's
grievance, finding that the past practice could be terminated only by mutual
agreement. The Second Circuit refused enforcement, declaring that "the mandate that the arbitrator stay within the confines of the collective bargaining
agreement ... requires a reviewing court to pass upon whether the agreement
authorizes the arbitrator to expand its express terms on the basis of the parties'
prior practice." 150 A dissenting judge argued that the court was improperly
reviewing the merits and that the arbitrator was entitled to look to "prior
practice, the conduct of the negotiation for the new contract and the agreement reached at the bargaining table to reach his conclusion that paid time
off for voting was 'an implied part of the contract.' " 151
The difficulty is that any time a court is incensed enough with an arbitrator's
reading of the contract and supplementary data such as past practice, bargaining history, and the "common law of the shop," it is simplicity itself to
conclude that the arbitrator must have "added to or altered" the collective
bargaining agreement. How else can one explain this abomination of a construction? Yet if the courts are to remain faithful to the injunction of Enterprise
Wheel, they must recognize that most arbitral aberrations are merely the product of fallible minds, not of overreaching power. 152 At bottom, there is an
inherent tension (if not inconsistency) between the ."final and binding" arbitration clause and the "no additions or modifications" provision. The arbitrator cannot be effective as the parties' surrogate for giving shape to their
necessarily amorphous contract unless he or she is allowed to fill the inevitable
lacunae.
"Gross error" is another accepted common-law ground for setting aside
arbitration awards. In Electronics Corp. of America v. Electrical Workers (JUE)
Local 272, 153 an award was vacated because "the central fact underlying an
arbitrator's decision [was] concededly erroneous.'' There the arbitrator had
assumed, contrary to the evidence as presented to the court, that an aggrieved
employee had not been suspended previously by the employer. Similarly, in
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, 154 the court refused enforcement of an award that was based on the arbitration panel's mistaken
150

Id. at 680.
362 F.2d at 683 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). See also H. K. Porter Co. v. Saw Workers Local
22254, 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964). Torrington was roundly criticized in Benjamin Aaron, "Judicial
Intervention in Labor Arbitration," 20 Stanford Law Review 41 (1967); Meltzer, supra n. 33, at 91 l.
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(West Publishing 1976).
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belief that the meaning of "pilot seniority list," in a letter from the company
to the union, was agreed to by both parties as not including furloughed pilots
in addition to active ones. Otlier courts, however, have been more rigorous
in adhering to the Enterprise Wheel and Misco standards. Thus the Third Circuit declared in Bieski v. Eastern Auto Forwarding Co.: "If the court is convinced both that the contract procedure was intended to cover the dispute
and, in addition, that the intended procedure was adequate to provide a fair
and informed decision, then review of the merits of any decision should be
limited to cases of fraud, deceit, or instances of unions in breach of their duty
of fair representation." 155
Procedural Unfairness or Irregularity
Fraud and corruption are universal bases for invalidating an award. 156 So is
bias or partiality, which may consist of improper157 conduct at the hearing or
an association with one party that is not disclosed to the other. 158
Much less common is the vacation of an award because of an unfair and
prejudicial exclusion or admission of evidence. Hearsay is ordinarily acceptable in arbitration proceedings, and arbitrators are accorded considerable latitude in their evidentiary determinations. 159 It is the excessively technical,
unexpected, and hurtful ruling that is likely to trigger judicial intervention. In
the interest of fostering finality, courts will rarely overturn an award on the
basis of new evidence not introduced at the hearing. 160
Individual Rights and Unfair Representation
It is well established that a union "may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion." 161 If a union so violates its
duty of fair representation, an adversely affected employee is relieved of the
obligation to exhaust grievance and arbitration procedures, and any arbitral
award loses the finality it would otherwise possess.
"' 396 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Aloha Motors, Inc. v. ILWU Local 142, 530 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1976).
156
See, e.g., Pacific & Arctic Railway and Navigation Co. v. Transportation Union, 952 F.2d 1144
(9th Cir. 1991).
157
Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), modified on other grounds, 514
F.2d 285 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
158
Colony Liquor Distrib., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 669, 34 App. Div. 2d 1060, 312 N.Y.S. 2d 403
(1970), aff'd, 28 N.Y. 2d 596, 268 N.E. 2d 645, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 849 (1971).
159
See Gorman, supra n. 152, at 59~03, and cases cited in text.
160
See id. at 601-2.
1 1
•
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). See also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650,652 (1965); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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A striking demonstration of this latter principle is Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc. 162 Trucking employees were discharged for alleged dishonesty in
seeking excessive reimbursement for lodging expenses. The employer presented motel receipts submitted by the employees which exceeded the charges
shown on the motel's books. Arbitration sustained the discharges. Later, evidence was secured indicating that the motel clerk, having recorded less than
was actually paid and pocketing the difference, was the culprit. In a suit by
the employees against the employer, the Supreme Court held that the employer
could not rely on the finality of the arbitration award if the union did not
fairly represent the employees in the arbitration proceedings. Such a rule can
hardly be faulted as an abstract proposition. But the results could be mischievous if the courts become too quick to equate a halting, inexpert investigation
or arbitration presentation by a lay union representative with "bad faith" or
''perfunctoriness.''
The Supreme Court ended a long debate over whether a union's negligence
alone could constitute unfair representation when it declared in Steelworkers
v. Rawson: 163 "The courts have in general assumed that mere negligence, even
in the enforcement of a collective-bargaining agreement, would not state a
claim for breach of the duty of fair representation, and we endorse that view
today." Previously, courts of appeals had made such statements as "the union
representative is not a lawyer and he cannot be expected to function as one," 164
and "intentional misconduct" is necessary for a violation; not even "gross"
negligence will suffice. 165 But the Supreme Court suggested in Vaca v. Sipes
that a union could breach the duty by processing a grievance in a "perfunctory
manner." 166
When an employer subject to the NLRA wrongfully discharges an employee
and the union aggravates the harm by improperly declining to arbitrate the
case, damages must be apportioned between the parties. 167 The union will be
liable to the extent it increased the employee's losses. For example, the union
may be responsible for the back pay that accrues after the date of the hypothetical arbitration decision that would have reinstated the employee. Punitive

162
424 U.S. 554 (1976). See also Bieski v. Eastern Auto Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.
1968). Cf. Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513,515 (1963); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.LR.B.
1080, 1082 (1955). But cf. Hotel Employees v. Michelson's Food Serv., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.
1976) (employee's mere objection to arbitration insufficient).
163
405 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990).
164
Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 ( 1980).
165
Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292 (1983).
166
386 U.S. 171 (l 967).
167
Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983). Cf. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25
(1970) (different rule applies under Railway Labor Act).
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damages are not available against unions for breach of the duty of fair representation in processing grievances. 168

Incomplete or Ambiguous Awards
Courts will not enforce arbitral awards that are so incomplete, ambiguous,
or self-contradictory in their terms that they do not provide necessary guidance to the parties subject to their directions. An arbitrator must answer the
question that has been submitted. 169 And an award must not defy understanding.170 At the same time, a mere ambiguity in the opinion, as distinguished
from the award, is not the sort of defect that should result in the vacation of
the award. 171
When an arbitrator has "imperfectly executed" his or her powers, and the
award is incomplete or otherwise deficient, the solution ordinarily is not for
the court to attempt to "correct" the error. The parties have bargained for the
arbitrator's decision, and the case should be remanded to permit that disposition.172 The Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel was in accord with that
approach. An award is not incomplete, however, just because the arbitrator
has left it to the parties to work out the mathematics of the back pay or other
amounts due. 173

Violation of Law
As I have urged earlier, 174 and as I believe Enterprise Wheel1 75 itself commands, an arbitrator confronted with an irreconcilable conflict between the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the apparent requirements of
statutory or decisional law should follow the contract and ignore the law. But
the parties to any contract will not be able to secure judicial enforcement if
their agreement is illegal or otherwise contrary to public policy. Similarly, the
court will not enforce an arbitral award that either sustains or orders conduct
violative of law or substantial public policy.
Such an approach involves no infidelity to Enterprise WheeL When a legal
challenge is mounted to an award, a court "is concerned with the lawfulness
168

IBEW v. Forest, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
IAM v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 300 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1962).
Bell Aerospace Co. v. UAW Local 516, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974).
171
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
172
Steelworkers Local 4839 v. New Idea Farms, 917 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1990).
173
Retail Clerks Local 954 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 67 L.R.R.M. 2871 (N.D. Ohio 1966), aff'd,
67 L.R.R.M. 2873 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968).
174
See supra text at n. 33.
175
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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of its enforcing the award and not with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision."176 In effect, the court is assuming the soundness of the arbitrator's
reading of the parties' agreement and is proceeding to test the validity and
enforceability of the award just as if it were a stipulation by the parties as to
their intended meaning.
In entertaining legal challenges to arbitral awards, the courts have had to
consider the impact of a wide variety of federal and state laws. These have
ranged from the Sherman Act 177 to the anti-kickback provisions of TaftHartley's section 302 178 to state protective legislation. 179 In years past, arbitral
awards were most often attacked on the grounds they approved or directed
the commission of an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. Despite
some forceful argument that a court in such cases should defer to the NLRB, 180
it is now the general view, I think rightly, that a court ought not to sanction
illegal conduct, even though that means it must step boldly into the unfair
labor practice thicket. After all, federal district courts make preliminary determinations of what constitutes an unfair labor practice in handling applications for injunctive relief under sections IO(j) and 10(1) of the NLRA. 181 In
addition, federal courts of appeals routinely review NLRB decisions, and state
courts are ultimately subject to Supreme Court oversight.
In passing upon unfair labor practices potentially lurking in arbitral awards,
the courts have not even shrunk from tangling with the intricacies of NLRA
section S(e)'s hot cargo ban. 182 Probably more frequent, however, is the situation where the arbitral award would have a coercive or "chilling" effect on
employees' protected activities. 183 The easiest case, naturally, is where the
NLRB has already acted by the time the court is asked to vacate the award.
11
• UAW Local 985 v. W.N. Chace Co., 262 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (emphasis in
the original), quoted in Botany Indus. v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
375 F. Supp. 485, 490 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974). See
Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Glendale
Mfg. Co. v. ILGWU Local 520,283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
177
See Associated Milk Dealers v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970).
178
See Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
998 (1974).
179
See UAW Local 985 v. W.M. Chace Co., 262 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Mich. 1966). But cf. UAW v.
Avco Tycoming Div., 66 Lab. Cas. ,11922 (D. Conn. 1971) (state law probably invalid under 1964
Civil Rights Act).
180
See Michael I. Sovern, "Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB," 76 Harvard
Law Review 529, 561-68 (1963) (citing Retail Clerks Locals 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,
369 U.S. 17 (1962)). But cf. Aaron, supra n. 151, at 53; Meltzer, supra n. 33, at 17 n. 40.
181
29 u.s.c. §160(j), 160(1) (1994).
182
Compare Botany Indus. v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 375 F. Supp.
485 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974); with La Mirada Trucking,
Inc. v. Teamsters Local 166, 538 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1976).
183
See Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1976); Hawaiian Hauling Serv.
v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
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Thus, in Glendale Manufacturing Co. v. ILGWU Local 520, 184 the court refused
to enforce an arbitrator's bargaining order against an employer when, shortly
after the award was issued, the union was defeated in an NLRB certification
election. 185
Absent a direct conflict with an outstanding order of a tribunal exercising
its proper jurisdiction, and absent any prejudice to third party rights, a union
and an employer should be bound by an arbitrator's interpretation even of
external law if they requested that interpretation, explicitly or implicitly, in
their submission agreement. The District of Columbia Circuit put it this way:
"Since the arbitrator is the 'contract reader,' his interpretation of the law
becomes part of the contract and thereby part of the private law governing
the relationship between the parties to the contract. Thus, the parties may not
seek relief from the courts for an alleged mistake of law by the arbitrator." 186

Violation of Public Policy
A more nebulous ground for vacating an award is that it is contrary to
"public policy." A court must resist the temptation to employ this rubric as
a device for asserting its own brand of civic philosophy. Invariably cited as an
example of such behavior is the McCarthy-era case of Black v. Cutter Laboratories.187 Cutter fired a communist employee, allegedly because of her party
membership. An arbitration panel held the real reason for the discharge was
her union activity and ruled this was not "just cause." The California Supreme
Court set aside the award, declaring that "an arbitration award which directs
that a member of the Communist Party who is dedicated to that party's program of 'sabotage, force, violence, and the like' be reinstated to employment
in a plant which produces antibiotics ... is against public policy." 188
JUE Local 453 v. Otis Elevator Co. 189 reflects a more enlightened attitude.
An employee was discharged for violating a company rule against gambling
after he had been convicted and fined for "policy" trafficking in the plant.
The arbitrator found him guilty but reduced the discharge to reinstatement
without back pay for seven months, emphasizing his good work record, family
18

283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
Cf Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 ( 1964) (arbitration of scope of bargaining
unit appropriate since dispute was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB).
186
American Postal Workers v. U.S. Postal Service, 789 F.2d l, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also Jones
Dairy Fann v. Food Workers Local P-1236, 760 F.2d 173, 176-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
845 (1985).
187
43 Cal. 2d 788,278 P. 2d 905, cert. granted, 350 U.S. 816 (1955), cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 292
(1956).
188
43 Cal. 2d. at 798-99, 278 P.2d at 911. See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sanford, 92
L.R.R.M. 3492 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
1
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hardship, and other factors. In upholding the arbitral award, the Second Circuit observed that the suspension and criminal fine vindicated the state's antigambling policy and that the reinstatement was in accord with the public
policy of criminal rehabilitation. Otis Elevator of course does not reject public
policy as a basis for vacating arbitral awards, but it does caution against an
overzealous resort to it. 190
The Supreme Court's decision in Misco,1 91 previously discussed, 192 should
have ended the confusion among the lower federal courts over the effect of
public policy on arbitral awards, but it did not. As will be recalled, the Court
there declared that an arbitral award should not be set aside unless "the contract as interpreted would violate 'some explicit public policy' that is 'well
defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.' " 193 Nonetheless, the courts of appeals have diverged widely in their
responses to this instruction, and unfortunately the Supreme Court has not
seen fit to step in and resolve the conflict. Thus, the First, 194 Second, 195 and
Fifth 196 Circuits have taken it upon themselves to find an award at odds with
their notions of public policy, even though the action ordered, such as reinstatement, would not have offended any positive law or binding public policy
if taken by the employer on its own initiative. In my judgment, the Seventh, 197
Ninth, 198 Tenth,1 99 and D.C. 200 Circuits have been far truer to the Misco mandate. In effect, they have enforced awards that did not sustain or order conduct
190

See also Machinists Dist. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1969).
484 U.S. 29 (1987).
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See supra text at n. 38.
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Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).
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U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984) (employee convicted of embezzling $4,325 worth of postal money orders).
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Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 922 (1991) (male printer sexually harassed female co-workers).
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Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983) (over-theroad truck driver drank while on duty); Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Marine Engineers Dist. 2,
889 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990) (grossly careless riverboat captain
nearly collided with barges).
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E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Independent Employees Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611 (7th
Cir. 1986) (during psychotic episode chemical worker stripped naked, attacked fellow employee,
and tried to start dangerous chemical reaction); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Allied Indus. Workers,
959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992) (male fork lift operator sexually harassed
female co-worker by grabbing her breasts).
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Stead Motors v. Machinists Lodge 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 946 (1990) (auto mechanic repeatedly failed to tighten lug nuts on wheels of cars,
endangering drivers and public).
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Communications Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Corp., 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1989) (electric
utility lineman in isolated incident sexually harassed customer in her home).
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Northwest Airlines v. ALPA, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (alcoholic airline pilot who had
been relicensed by the FAA).
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that would have been forbidden to the employer acting unilaterally. The
Third, 201 Eighth,2° 2 and Eleventh203 Circuits have waffled on the issue.
The relationship of arbitral awards and public policy is probably the hottest
current issue of judicial review. For me, three estimable critics have correctly
assessed the problem and come up with the right solution. In various formulations, Judge Frank Easterbrook204 and Professors Charles Craver205 and
David Feller2°6 have concluded that if the employer (or the employer in conjunction with the union) has the lawful authority to take unilaterally the action
directed by the arbitrator, such as reinstatement of a wrongdoing employee,
the arbitral award should be upheld. That approach is entirely faithful to the
underlying notion that the arbitrator is the parties' surrogate, their designated
spokesperson in reading the contract, and what they are entitled to say or do,
the arbitrator is entitled to say or order.

Conclusion
Arbitration, with its attendant safeguards against arbitrary action by management, may well be collective bargaining's greatest contribution to the welfare of American working people-even more than the economic gains
secured by union contracts.207 For employers, too, the advantages of arbitration are manifest. The alternatives are strikes and lost production, or
prolonged, costly, and burdensome court litigation. Despite the natural unhappiness of any losing party to an arbitration, and despite disturbing signs
201
Compare U.S. Postal Service v. Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1989) (postal worker
shot at supervisor's car); with Stroehmann Bakeries v. Teamsters Local 776, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022 (1992) (arbitrator held "industrial due process" standards had
been violated and did not rule on merits of charge that driver sexually harassed female employee
of customer).
202
Compare Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. !BEW Local 24, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987)
(employee in nuclear power plant defeated safety lock on door to take shortcut to lunch); with
Osceola County Rural Water System v. Subsurfro, 914 F.2d 1072 (8th Cir. 1990) (construction
employee falsified safety test results).
203
Compare U.S. Postal Service v. Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775 (I Ith Cir. 1988) (postal worker
stole from the mails), and Delta Air Lines v. ALPA, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 871 (1989) (alcoholic airline pilot who had been relicensed by the FAA); with Florida
Power Corp. v. !BEW, 847 F.2d 680 (11th Cir. 1988) (employee in possession of cocaine drove
while drunk).
20
• Easterbrook, supra n. 35, at 70-77.
205
Craver, supra n. 104, at 604-5.
206
David E. Feller, "Court Review of Arbitration," 43 Labor Law Journal 539, 543 (1992).
201
See, e.g., Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 463-65
(Simon and Schuster 1970); Albert Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions 74, 89-90, 186-87 (2d
ed., University of Chicago Press 1977); cf. Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do
Unions Do? 103-10 (Basic Books 1984).
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of an increasing willingness of certain lower courts to set aside arbitral awards
on vague grounds of "public policy,"208 it is significant that over 98 percent
of all arbitration decisions are still accepted without resort to judicial review. 209
Regrettably, the Supreme Court has been strangely willing of late to leave
standing federal appellate rulings that appear unfaithful to its more salutary
teachings. 210 Nonetheless, whenever the Court has spoken, it has issued ringing
re-endorsements of the arbitration process. 211 As reflected in Gilmer,212 the
prospects are for a substantial expansion of arbitration or other forms of
alternative dispute resolution in the field of nonunion as well as unionized
employment. 213 The challenges for the future include curbing the impulse of
some lower courts to substitute their judgment for that of the parties' chosen
arbiter, and designing a suitable regulatory framework for arbitration as it
moves into new, unfamiliar terrain. So far the law has shown signs that it is
equal at least to the latter task.
208
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